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What action have governments taken on the Brandt
Report one year after its publication? The answer is
rather little. An improvement in the volume and the
terms of lending by the international financial institutions
through measures suggested in the Brandt Report has
been taking place both at the World Bank and the
IMF. An international Cocoa Agreement was finally
signed last November. Most rich country governments,
apart from Britain, have increased their aid, or plan to
do so. But otherwise, governments have generally
been feeble in their actions, despite the extensive
press and public interest in a number of Northern
countries, notably Britain.
Lack of political will is, to a certain extent, a cause of
the absence of progress; but in many ways it is only a
reflection of a deeper reason for the North-South
stalemate. This is the failure on the part of the North
to comprehend, first, its stake in the development of
the South and, second, the dynamics of the North-
South relationship.
The Stake of the North in the South
The tendency in the North to think of the South, or at
least of those Southern countries which are not already
of major economic importance, as troublesome
dependencies remains as strong as ever. The poorer
developing countries are seen as marginal actors who
want to get a free ride' in the world economy by a
combination of psychological pressure on the North
and exploitation of the leverage possessed by their
more powerful colleagues in the South, particularly
OPEC.
This failure to understand the enormous economic
potential of the less wealthy developing countries,
both as markets and as suppliers of raw materials and
cheap manufactures, is compounded by two further
misconceptions. The first is to see existing international
economic and financial arrangements as essentially
healthy and adequate. Many of those who hold this
view ascribe the very real danger of default by some
major developing countries entirely to poor domestic
management on their part, despite falling prices for
many of their exports on the world market and
continuously rising oil prices. Similarly, the tendency
of current re-cycling mechanisms to channel the over-
whelming proportion of the world's financial surpluses
to less than 30 developing countries is regarded as an
inevitable consequence of 'prudent banking practices',
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rather than as a phenomenon which is amenable to
externally-assisted change.
The next misconception is to pin the blame for the
world's economic malaise on OPECwhich is therefore
held to be duty-bound to pick up the pieces. In fact,
OPEC is not the sole cause of global economic stagnation.
Growth in the West had been slowing down for some
time before the first major increase in the price of oil
in 1973-74; and, in the period since then, the industrialised
democracies have shown that by their still immense
consumption of oil, combined with competitive bidding
for supplies in times of temporary shortage, they have
contributed greatly to the rise in its price. But important
though this point is, it is not the dominant reason why
apportioning blame to OPEC is an exercise in futility
for the West. The dominant reason is, in fact, that
OPEC is simply refusing either to bear sole responsibility
for the fate of the non-oil developing countries or to
make an unreciprocated pledge to supply the consumers
with reliable deliveries of oil at predictable prices the
West's two main demands of them. The question
which therefore faces the industrialised countries is
how to provide the major oil producers with incentives
which will induce them both to re-cycle their surpluses
to the developing countries where they are most
urgently needed, and to assure the delivery of adequate
quantities of oil to permit the recovery of the world
economy.
For example, the OPEC countries might be induced to
place more of their funds in the international financial
institutions for re-cycling to the non-oil developing
world if they were given more equitable powers of
decision-making within them, and if more effective
mechanisms for co-financing between these institutions
and official holders of OPEC funds could be devised.
Neither of these methods would be costly to the
industrialised countries; yet too little has been done to
explore their potential. Failure to do more to find a
home for OPEC funds in the non-oil Third World may
intensify internal pressures on OPEC leaders to put a
stop to the source of these surplusesnamely, current
levels of oil production. There is therefore an inescapable
link between the efficacy of the re-cycling process and
the energy security of the industrialised countriesa
fact which they still do not fully appreciate.
This catalogue of misunderstanding and ignorance
contributes to the slogan that major initiatives to
develop the South cannot be taken in the 'current
economic climate', and that we had therefore better
'put our own house in order' before tackling the
problems of others. Such a view is, of course, unlikely
to lead to more than minor alterations to existing
mechanisms of economic management; but we shall
not escape from our economic malaise until governments
recognise that escape depends on fundamental changes
to international economic arrangements, such as those
enumerated in the Brandt Report, and is not merely a
prerequisite for undertaking them.
Unfortunately, the strategic importance of the develop-
ment of the South has been no more clearly understood
in the North than has its economic rationale. For
example, the diplomatic settlement in Zimbabwe has
been followed up only by the most parsimonious
financial support. Yet the Zimbabwean economy
remains precarious; white emigration is in danger of
accelerating; and the political rivalries which are
facilitated by disappointed economic expectations are
intensifying. A major effort by the West to support the
economic development of Zimbabwe would greatly
enhance the influence and appeal of Western ideology
in Southern Africa as a wholenot least in the Marxist
countries of Mozambique and Angola. If such an
effort were combined with new initiatives to facilitate
economic co-operation between black Southern African
states, it could do a great deal to free them from
dependence on South Africa. That, in turn, would be
a key step in the process of isolating and removing
apartheid.
In the Carribbean, too, the stability of a vital region
and the influence of the West are dependent on the
provision of sustained economic assistance. The
emergence of a government in Jamaica which is
sympathetic to the interests and economic principles
of the West provides Britain with a major strategic and
political opportunity. Failure to respond to it would
both damage the stability of Jamaica itself and demoralise
the forces of moderation which are struggling to
succeed in the region.
The Dynamics of North-South Relations
The lack of understanding in the West of its economic
and strategic interests in the development of the Third
World is only one reason for the stalemate in the
North-South dialogue. A second and equally important
reason is the misunderstandings, on the part of both
North and South, of each other's motives in the
dialogue.
For the South, the concentration of the North on
'basic human needs' and the eradication of 'absolute
poverty' is widely seen as a cynical pioy to deny them
maturity and status as actors in the international
system. Many developing countries suspect that by
focusing on these themes the North wants to stymy
their industrial development and the economic and
political power which this would bring. However, this
impression, though understandable, is flawed as a
generalisation of Northern motives.
The North, on the other hand, finds the demands of
the South for major action on a very wide range of
issues unrealistic as an immediate goal. This is not
unjustified. But in its concentration on the 'basic
human needs' approach the North makes two funda-
mental mistakes about the objectives of the South.
The first is to underestimate the intense desire of most
Southern leaders for status and participation in the
international economic system, as well as for financial
and technical assistance from it. The second is to
dismiss the unity of the South in the Group of 77 as
'artificial' and 'unsustainable'. The demonstrable fact
that the unity of the South has survived, despite the
rapidly growing divergence in the economic interests
and power of its members in recent years, should be
enough to dispel such a misconception. Unity is
maintained in a fragile but nevertheless durable state
by a potent combination of factors; first, the psychologi-
cal wounds inflicted by colonialism; second, the CQfl1Ofl
desire for status and participation in the international
economic systemalready referred towhich even
the wealthiest oil producers feel they do not adequately
possess; and third, the belief on the part of the non-oil
developing countries that they have less to gain from
an independent negotiating posture or from a bargaining
alliance with the West than they can derive from
solidarity with the OPEC countriesdespite the damage
which the policies of the latter have inflicted on their
economies. Moreover, the unity of the South most
definitely transcends the cosy circuit of official
negotiations within the UN and other international
bodies.
These realities have important consequences for the
bargaining posture of the North. The first is that it is
fruitless to try to divide the South by selectively co-
opting its more influential members into international
economic arrangements which are basically designed
by the North. This does not mean that negotiations
between a restricted number of participants are
impossible or undesirable. Qn the contrary, they are
essential if major progress in the North-South dialogue
is to be made. But the North must make it clear that its
aim would not be to divide the South but rather to help
to create a series of arrangements which could form a
much-needed starting point for negotiations in the
global fora. This, indeed, should be the aim of the
North-South Summit which is scheduled for this
summer.
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Second, the developing countries will need to be given
more status and influence within the international
financial institutions. This would probably induce the
wealthy oil-producing countries to deposit a greater
proportion of their surplus assets in these institutions
as well as to assume greater responsibility for
underwriting their loans. The result would therefore
be to enhance their credit-worthiness, particularly as
the major surplus countries of OPEC are as interested
as the North in maintaining high standards of banking.
Although such a redistribution of power within the
international institutions would need to be undertaken
gradually in order to maintain the confidence of the
North, there is therefore no justification for the obstinate
opposition of the North to any progress on this front.
Third, it is essential that the North should now take
the diplomatic offensive in the Dialogue by presenting
the South with an interim package of measures which
goes some way to meeting its legitimate aspirations. If
the industrialised countries remain defensive in their
approach, there will be little hope of moderating and
narrowing the demands of the South. Nor will the
prospects be good for achieving closer co-operation
with OPEC over the urgent issues of oil pricing and
supply, debt management and the re-cycling of their
surplus assets to the developing world.
The priorities which any such Western initiative needs
to have were outlined in the Emergency Programme
of the Brandt Report. I have developed them in a 14-
point memorandum which I sent to all the Heads of
State or Government before the Summit of the Western
Seven last June. The Institute of Development Studies
itself has played an invaluable role in helping to define
See The Times, 19 June 1980.
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the imperatives for action and the means by which
progress may best be achieved.
All the issues that I have raised here - the economic
and strategic interests of the West in the development
of the South; the misunderstandings between North
and South about their interests and motives in the
Dialogue; and the need for a Northern diplomatic
offensivewill not necessarily be acted upon, even if
they are understood by the world's major leaders.
What is also needed is a forum which is capable of
breaking the vicious circle of stalemate, disillusionment,
hostility and continued stalemate which has taken
such a firm hold on the North-South Dialogue.
The traditional negotiating fora will not achieve this.
Attitudes in them are too entrenched and too permeated
with suspicions, and the problems involved are too
complex to be tackled by their cumbersome and
inflexible procedures. This is why it is now necessary
to make a start with the concept and machinery of
summitry to deal with the most urgent of the common
problems facing North and South. The purpose of the
Summit would not be to substitute for the role of
negotiations in the international organisations. This
would be neither desirable or possible. Its role would
rather be to give greater impetus and direction to
themand in particular to the forthcoming Global
Negotiations. To stage a successful summit, or series
of summits, on North-South issues will involve great
difficulties of a psychological and political nature. But
the world's major leaders must rise above the immediate
constraints. Then it may at last be possible to break
through the petty formalism of the present negotiating
fora and set both the rich nations and the poor on a
path of greater prosperity and peace.
